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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, Randy James Newcomb was arrested for first degree 
driving while impaired and for felony test refusal.1 Newcomb was 
sentenced to four years imprisonment, but the sentence was stayed 
for seven years.2 In 2007, Newcomb was arrested for violating his 
probation, was sent to jail, and was again released in 2009.3 Under 
Minnesota law, if a person is arrested for a first degree DWI and 
that person’s sentence is stayed, the sentencing court must place 
that person on five years of supervised release.4 Evidently, the 
sentencing court failed to do this with Newcomb.5 Once Newcomb 
was imprisoned, a correctional officer wrote to the sentencing 
court asking that the court add a term of conditional release.6 The 
judge did not respond, but someone within the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections administratively added a conditional 
release to Newcomb’s sentence.7 
Thus, Newcomb’s sentence without the conditional release was 
set to expire April 13, 2010.8 If, on the other hand, the conditional 
 
 1.  State ex rel. Newcomb v. Roy, No. A10-2075, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011).  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.276, subdiv. 1(d) (2015) (“[W]hen the 
court commits a person to the custody of the commissioner of corrections under 
this subdivision, it shall provide that after the person has been released from 
prison the commissioner shall place the person on conditional release for five 
years.”). 
 5.  Newcomb, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Id. 
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release had been imposed in accordance with Minnesota law, 
Newcomb’s conditional release would have expired on January 12, 
2014.9 On April 15, 2010, just two days after Newcomb’s original 
sentence expired, Newcomb was arrested for violating a condition 
of his release.10 Newcomb’s conditional release was revoked, and he 
was sentenced for an additional 150 days.11 
While Newcomb was able to successfully petition for habeas 
corpus, what options would have been available to Newcomb if he 
did not discover the violation of his rights until after he had already 
served his additional time? Under the current law, it would all 
depend on in which jurisdiction Newcomb had the fortune or 
misfortune to have been imprisoned.12 
In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that 
prisoners must seek a favorable termination in habeas proceedings 
before challenging the fact or duration of confinement in a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action.13 In Spencer v. Kemna, however, the Court 
walked back this holding, hinting at the possibility that it would not 
apply where the prisoner has been released from prison.14 Some 
circuit courts have, after counting the votes, decided that the Heck 
“favorable termination rule” does not apply to released prisoners.15 
Other circuit courts have decided to apply the Heck rule according 
to dicta pointing to the proposition that the favorable termination 
rule would apply once the prisoner was released even though 
habeas proceedings would be foreclosed.16 The Eighth Circuit 
follows the latter approach.17 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split in which some 
jurisdictions require released prisoners to have had a favorable termination of 
their matter while others do not impose such a requirement).  
 13.  512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994); see infra Section II.B (discussing the history and 
outcome of Heck v. Humphrey).  
 14.  523 U.S. 1 (1998); see infra Section II.C (discussing the plurality of 
justices that held that the favorable termination rule would not apply to released 
prisoners to bar a § 1983 claim).  
 15.  See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split, with some circuits 
following the holding of Heck v. Humphrey).  
 16.  See infra Section II.D (discussing the circuit split, with some circuits 
following the holding of Spencer v. Kemna).  
 17.  See infra Part III (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s application of the Heck 
rule in such cases as Newmy v. Johnson and Entzi v. Redmann). 
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This article examines Heck, the origins of the current conflict, 
and the current circuit split in Part II.18 This article also examines 
the application of the rule by the Eighth Circuit in Part III.19 In Part 
IV, the article looks at habeas corpus law as it pertains to the Heck 
favorable termination rule.20 In Part V, this article argues that the 
Eighth Circuit is on the wrong side of the split and its decisions are 
due to be overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court.21 The article 
concludes the argument in Part VI.22 
II. HISTORY, HECK, AND HECK’S AFTERMATH 
A. A Brief History of § 1983 
This article will rely on the history of § 1983 described in 
Monroe v. Pape.23 Section 1983 began as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871.24 The passage of the Act was spurred by the Union-general 
turned-United-States-President, Ulysses S. Grant.25 On March 23, 
1871, President Grant sent a message to Congress reading: 
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the 
Union rendering life and property insecure and the 
carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue 
dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs 
exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the 
power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State 
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the 
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of 
 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra Part V. 
 22.  See infra Part VI. 
 23.  365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). Monroe was responsible for overruling, at least implicitly, Blyew v. 
United States, which had upheld a circuit court decision essentially impeding a 
black person from testifying against white defendants who had killed several of her 
family members. 80 U.S. 581, 583, 595 (1871). For an excellent recitation of the 
facts of the Blyew case, see Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional 
Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 469–74 (1989).  
 24.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 is also commonly 
known as the third Enforcement Act. Historical Events: Ku Klux Klan Bill Enacted—
April 20, 1871, MILLER CTR., http://millercenter.org/president/about/historical-
events#4_20 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). This article refers to the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871 as the “Act.”  
 25.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. 
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existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not 
clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation 
as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure 
life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in 
all parts of the United States.26 
The record shows three main purposes of the Act.27 First, the 
Act was meant to override certain state laws that allowed state 
agents to abuse their authority by depriving people of their 
constitutional rights.28 Second, the Act was meant to “provide a 
remedy where state law was inadequate.”29 Finally, the Act was 
meant to correct situations in which there was a state remedy in 
place which was “adequate in theory, [but] not available in 
practice.”30 In this, it was the specter of the Klan and the 
 
 26.  Id. at 172–73. 
 27.  Id. at 173. 
 28.  Id. However, according to one U.S. Senator, Senator Sloss of Alabama, 
“there were no such laws.” Id. Senator Sloss protested:  
The first section of this bill prohibits any invidious legislation by States 
against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States. The 
object of this section is not very clear, as it is not pretended by its 
advocates on this floor that any State has passed any laws endangering 
the rights or privileges of the colored people. 
Id. Senator Sloss appears to have forgotten the Black Codes, which, beginning as 
early as 1865, required blacks “to make contracts, work sunup to sundown, and ask 
permission before leaving the premises . . . .” LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT 
SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871–1872, at 3 (1996). Additionally, the 
Black Codes forbade any black person from working in any profession outside of 
agriculture. Id.  
 29.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. Senator Sherman of Ohio expressed the purpose 
thus:  
[I]t is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a 
negro by a white man, and a negro cannot testify in any case against a 
white man, so that the only way by which any conviction can be had in 
Kentucky in those cases is in the United States courts, because the 
United States courts enforce the United States laws by which negroes 
may testify. 
Id. at 173–74.  
 30.  Id. at 174. As Mr. Lowe artfully described it:  
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and 
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending 
American citizens, the local administrations have been found 
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, 
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the 
worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped [sic] of justice. 
Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are 
5
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compliance of state officials that the Act was meant to remedy.31 As 
Senator Osborn put it: 
That the State courts in the several States have been 
unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective 
States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact 
that the preservation of life and property in many sections 
of the country is beyond the power of the State 
government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should, 
so far as they have authority under the Constitution, enact 
the laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the 
United States.32 
B. Heck v. Humphrey 
Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in an 
Indiana state court.33 While Heck’s appeal was being considered, 
Heck filed a § 1983 claim against Indiana prosecutors and an 
 
searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress. 
Id. at 175. 
 31.  See id. at 175–76 (“While one main scourge of the evil—perhaps the 
leading one—was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against 
it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were 
unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.”). 
 32.  Id. at 176. 
 33.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). Roy and Rickie Heck were 
husband and wife. Heck v. Indiana, 552 N.E.2d 446, 448 (Ind. 1990). Rickie, 
however, commenced dissolution proceedings. Id. On the evening of January 6, 
1986, several witnesses in the vicinity of Rickie’s trailer heard an argument 
between Rickie and a man. Id. While some witnesses did not see the person with 
whom Rickie was arguing, others identified the other party as a tall, young man. 
Id. at 448–49. Just one witness identified the other party as Roy. Id. at 449. The 
witness, however, only identified him by his voice. Id. Following the argument, 
Rickie disappeared sometime between January 5 and 6, 1986. Id. at 448. Nearly ten 
months later, Rickie’s body was found on a farm owned by Roy. Id. The pathologist 
opined upon his second examination of the body, that a blow to the head caused 
Rickie’s death. Id. Roy exhibited a great deal of suspicious behavior following the 
disappearance of Rickie. See id. at 449. First, Roy told acquaintances that Rickie 
had left for Florida. Id. However, one of Rickie’s bags was found in Roy’s home. Id. 
Second, Roy requested that a couple of his female companions call the police 
pretending to be Rickie. Id. Next, Roy requested that his daughter and girlfriend 
dispose of several bags that were owned by Rickie and spread pepper over the 
place where Rickie’s body was eventually found. Id. The jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on the count of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 448. 
6
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investigator.34 The complaint alleged that the defendants had 
knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence.35 
The federal district court dismissed the claim without 
prejudice as the claim implicated the legality of Roy’s 
confinement.36 While this decision was on appeal in federal court, 
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld Roy’s conviction and sentence 
on direct appeal.37 When the Seventh Circuit finally decided the 
case, the court affirmed, holding that: 
If, regardless of the relief sought, the plaintiff is 
challenging the legality of his conviction, so that if he won 
his case the state would be obliged to release him even if 
he hadn’t sought that relief, the suit is classified as an 
application for habeas corpus and the plaintiff must 
exhaust his state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he fails 
to do so.38 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.39 According to the 
Court, the action lay at the intersection of § 1983 and the federal 
habeas corpus statute.40 While § 1983 does not necessarily require 
an exhaustion of state remedies, an action brought under the 
 
 34.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 478–79. Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 35.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 39.  Heck v. Humphrey, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994). 
 40.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 479; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). Section 
2254 provides: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State; or [that] there is an absence of available State 
corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process 
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (emphasis added).  
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federal habeas corpus statute does require a plaintiff to exhaust all 
state remedies.41 
The Court began by reviewing relevant case law.42 First, Preiser 
v. Rodriguez held that an inmate challenging the fact or duration of 
confinement must do so through a habeas corpus proceeding.43 
The Heck Court noted that the Preiser Court, in dictum, opined that 
an action for damages may be brought through a § 1983 action, 
because an action for damages, rather than release, is not 
challenging the fact or duration of confinement.44 The Heck Court 
rejected this notion, stating: 
That statement may not be true, however, when 
establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily 
demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction. In that 
situation, the claimant can be said to be “attacking . . . the 
fact or length of . . . confinement,” bringing the suit 
within the other dictum of Preiser: “Congress has 
determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy 
for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or 
length of their confinement, and that specific 
determination must override the general terms of § 1983.” 
In the last analysis, we think the dicta of Preiser to be an 
unreliable, if not an unintelligible, guide: that opinion 
had no cause to address, and did not carefully consider, 
the damages question before us today.45 
The Court then went on to reject the petitioner’s contention 
that the issue was decided in Wolff v. McDonnell.46 In applying Preiser, 
 
 41.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 480–81 (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 
501 (1982)). In Patsy, Patsy sued her employer, Florida International University, 
claiming that she was impermissibly denied opportunities based on race and sex. 
457 U.S. at 498. While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the district 
court for a determination regarding state remedies, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, declaring, “this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a 
prerequisite to an action under § 1983 . . . .” Id. at 500–01.  
 42.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–83.  
 43.  Id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–90 (1973)). 
Preiser involved a challenge by inmates who were denied good-time credit as a 
result of disciplinary proceedings. 411 U.S. at 476. The inmates demanded 
injunctive relief that, if granted, would result in the inmates’ release from custody. 
Id. at 476–77. 
 44.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494). 
 45.  Id. at 481–82 (citation omitted) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490).  
 46.  Id. at 482 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). In Wolff, 
Wolff brought a § 1983 action on behalf of himself and other inmates of the 
8
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the Wolff Court held that while Wolff’s action for restoration of 
good time credits was barred, the suit for damages was not, even 
though it “required determination of the validity of the procedures 
employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for 
flagrant or serious misconduct.”47 The Heck Court concluded, 
however, that Wolff only allowed a § 1983 claim for using the wrong 
process rather than for denying good time credits.48 Further, the 
use of the wrong procedure did not affect the denial of the good 
time credits, which would call into question the fact or duration of 
confinement.49 Therefore, to complete the tautology, the allowance 
of the case to continue for monetary damages did not affect the 
fact or duration of confinement.50 
As a § 1983 action is a sort of tort action, the Court 
determined that a study of common law tort actions would provide 
guidance.51 The tort of malicious prosecution provided the best 
analogy because “it permits damages for confinement imposed 
pursuant to legal process.”52 Malicious prosecution requires that the 
 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, Lincoln, Nebraska. 418 U.S. at 542. 
Wolff alleged that the disciplinary process did not comply with Due Process 
requirements. Id. at 543. Wolff sued for restoration of good time credits and 
monetary damages. Id.  
 47.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554. 
 48.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 482–83 (“[T]he claim as one of ‘damages for the 
deprivation of civil rights,’ rather than damages for the deprivation of good-time 
credits, we think this passage recognized a § 1983 claim for using the wrong 
procedures, not for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits). 
Nor is there any indication in the opinion, or any reason to believe, that using the 
wrong procedures necessarily vitiated the denial of good-time credits. Thus, the 
claim at issue in Wolff did not call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s 
continuing confinement.”). The distinction between an attack on a procedure and 
an attack on a result has since been walked back by Edwards v. Balisok. 520 U.S. 
641, 645–46 (1997). In Balisok, an inmate filed a § 1983 claim alleging that the 
procedure used to deprive him of thirty days of good-time credit was deficient. Id. 
at 643. Balisok requested damages and injunctive relief. Id. His amended 
complaint did not request restoration of the credit. Id. at 644. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that a claim only attacking the procedure is always 
cognizable. Id. In holding that Balisok’s claim ran afoul of Heck, the Court 
reasoned that even attacking the procedure used to deprive Balisok of good-time 
credits could call into question the fact or length of confinement. Id. at 645–46. 
 49.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 483. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 484 (noting also that a claim for false imprisonment is a less 
applicable candidate as an award for false imprisonment only covered the time of 
9
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previous criminal proceeding be terminated in favor of the 
accused.53 According to the Court, 
This requirement “avoids parallel litigation over the issues 
of probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the 
possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort 
action after having been convicted in the underlying 
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial 
policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions 
arising out of the same or identical transaction.”54 
The Court ultimately held that, 
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct 
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by 
a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, 
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a 
writ of habeas corpus.55 
This holding has since become known as the favorable 
termination rule.56 
 
arrest up until arraignment, but did not include damages regarding confinement 
as malicious prosecution would). 
 53.  Id.; see Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375, 379 (1879) (“As a rule, it must be 
averred and proved, in an action for a malicious prosecution, that the prosecution 
complained of is at an end, and that it has terminated favorably to the plaintiff.”). 
See generally Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 39 Pa. 288, 292 (1861) (discussing the 
elements required for a successful claim for malicious prosecution). 
 54.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 (quoting 8 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, & 
ALFRED W. GANS, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24 (1991)).  
 55.  Id. at 486–87. The Heck rule has since been described as being based 
upon, amongst other ideas, the concept of comity. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 
U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (“These considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and 
comity led the Court to find an implicit exception from § 1983’s otherwise broad 
scope for actions that lie ‘within the core of habeas corpus.’” (quoting Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)); see also Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 382 
(7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (“Heck extends the Preiser rule to include § 1983 
suits which request monetary, rather than injunctive, relief, for reasons of finality, 
consistency, and comity.”).  
 56.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 2008). 
10
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C. The Roots of the Conflict 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted that the 
analysis of the majority could lead to inequitable results by shutting 
potential litigants out of court.57 Justice Souter posited the 
following hypothetical: 
Consider the case of a former slave framed by Ku Klux 
Klan-controlled law-enforcement officers and convicted by 
a Klan-controlled state court of, for example, raping a 
white woman; and suppose that the unjustly convicted 
defendant did not (and could not) discover the proof of 
unconstitutionality until after his release from state 
custody. If it were correct to say that § 1983 independently 
requires a person not in custody to establish the prior 
invalidation of his conviction, it would have been equally 
right to tell the former slave that he could not seek 
federal relief even against the law-enforcement officers 
who framed him unless he first managed to convince the 
state courts that his conviction was unlawful. That would 
be a result hard indeed to reconcile either with the 
purpose of § 1983 or with the origins of what was 
“popularly known as the Ku Klux Act,” the statute having 
been enacted in part out of concern that many state 
courts were “in league with those who were bent upon 
abrogation of federally protected rights.” It would also be 
a result unjustified by the habeas statute or any other 
post–§ 1983 enactment.58 
 
 57.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 501 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 58.  Id. at 501–02 (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 
651, 657 (1951); Mitchem v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972)). The notion of a 
framed person seeking redress through § 1983 is not far-fetched. In fact, that is 
exactly what happened in Hibma v. Odegaard. 576 F.Supp. 1549 (W.D. Wis. 1984), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 769 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1985). In that case, three deputy 
sheriffs undertook to frame Hibma for burglaries that they themselves had 
committed. Id. at 1551. The deputies contrived a plan in which they would get 
Hibma to steal a pistol and then sell it to the deputies’ confederate. Id. The plan 
went off as expected, and the deputies brought Hibma in for questioning on the 
burglary and theft of the pistol. Id. The deputies then ignored Hibma’s requests 
for a lawyer and requests for medical treatment for his narcotics withdrawals, 
eventually obtaining a confession from Hibma. Id. Hibma also gave consent for the 
deputies to search his home. Id. The deputies then proceeded to Hibma’s home 
where they planted evidence regarding their own burglaries. Id. at 1552. When the 
sheriff and other deputies arrived, they found the evidence. Id. Hibma eventually 
pled guilty to the burglary and theft of the handgun, in return for which the 
11
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded by stating 
that the application of the rule should not depend on whether the 
prisoner is in or out of custody.59 The majority went on to explain 
that § 1983 was not intended to give redress to every possible 
harm.60 For instance, the immunity doctrines bar recovery against 
judges.61 
In Spencer v. Kemna, the Court was asked to decide whether a 
habeas corpus petition was moot after a prisoner’s release.62 As the 
 
prosecutor dismissed the other burglary charges. Id. Hibma spent over a year in 
jail for the offense before being released. Id. Hibma did not learn about the 
planted evidence until three years later. Id. This case was decided before the Heck 
decision; because Hibma did not know about the violation until after his release, it 
is likely that the case never would have survived the favorable termination rule. 
Challenging the planting of evidence, which led to Hibma’s pleading guilty, likely 
would have also challenged the fact or length of Hibma’s confinement. 
 59.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n.10 (“We think the principle barring collateral 
attacks—a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of both the common law and 
our own jurisprudence—is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a 
convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”). 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (“But if, as Justice Souter 
appears to suggest, the goal of our interpretive enterprise under § 1983 were to 
provide a remedy for all conceivable invasions of federal rights that freedmen may 
have suffered at the hands of officials of the former States of the Confederacy, the 
entire landscape of our § 1983 jurisprudence would look very different. We would 
not, for example, have adopted the rule that judicial officers have absolute 
immunity from liability for damages under § 1983, a rule that would prevent 
recovery by a former slave who had been tried and convicted before a corrupt state 
judge in league with the Ku Klux Klan.”). The doctrine of judicial immunity is, of 
course, explicit from the language of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 
(“[E]xcept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable.”). The statute, however, has been found to not abrogate other 
common law immunities. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). Some 
of these immunities include the Feres doctrine, which blocks suits arising out of 
actions incident to service. See Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(sovereign immunity); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979) (Eleventh 
Amendment immunity); DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 296–97 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(prosecutorial immunity). 
 62.  523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). The Court determined that a habeas petition was 
moot once the prisoner was no longer incarcerated. Id. at 18. Most state courts 
lying within the Eighth Circuit have reached the same conclusion when examining 
state habeas petitions. See Anderson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Ark. 2003) 
(dismissing appeal of denial of habeas petition where the prisoner had been 
released from custody); Case v. Wood, 377 N.W.2d 924, 924 (Minn. 1985) 
12
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petitioner had already been released from prison, he was required 
to show collateral consequences of the conviction.63 Spencer 
argued that he would suffer collateral consequences due to Heck’s 
favorable termination rule; if Spencer’s habeas corpus petition 
were dismissed, his ability to level a § 1983 action would also be 
foreclosed.64 The Court concluded that the argument was: 
[A] great non sequitur, unless one believes (as we do not) 
that a § 1983 action for damages must always and 
everywhere be available. It is not certain, in any event, that 
a § 1983 damages claim would be foreclosed. If, for 
example, petitioner were to seek damages “for using the 
wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result,” 
and if that procedural defect did not “necessarily imply 
the invalidity of” the revocation, then Heck would have no 
application all.65 
Justice Souter, writing for the four concurring justices, argued 
that the holding in Heck would not foreclose Spencer’s § 1983 claim 
as “Heck did not hold that a released prisoner in Spencer’s 
circumstances is out of court on a § 1983 claim, and for reasons 
explained in [his] Heck concurrence, it would be unsound to read 
either Heck or the habeas statute as requiring any such result.”66 
According to the concurrence, the broad and general § 1983 
statute should be read in light of the specific habeas corpus statute, 
as such a reading would require § 1983 to yield to the habeas 
corpus statute only where they conflict.67 
 
(dismissing appeal of petition where prisoner was already released from custody); 
State ex rel. D.W. v. Hensley, 574 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (declaring 
petition for release from involuntary hospitalization moot after hospitalization had 
terminated); State ex rel. Magrum v. Nygaard, 38 N.W.2d 370, 370 (N.D. 1949) 
(declaring habeas petition moot where petitioner was ordered released from 
custody by a different order of the court); Moeller v. Solem, 395 N.W.2d 165, 165–
66 (S.D. 1986) (habeas petition was moot after the petitioner had been paroled 
and the conviction would not affect parole eligibility).  
 63.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–8. 
 64.  Id. at 17. 
 65.  Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 482–83, 487).  
 66.  Id. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer joined the concurrence. See id. at 18–21. 
 67.  Id. at 20 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 500) (“I also thought we were bound 
to recognize the apparent scope of § 1983 when no limitation was required for the 
sake of honoring some other statute or weighty policy, as in the instance of habeas. 
Accordingly, I thought it important to read the Court’s Heck opinion as subjecting 
only inmates seeking § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or 
13
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Justice Stevens was the final vote.68 In his dissent, he argued 
that the claim was not moot as the petitioner was challenging the 
facts underlying the conviction rather than simply asking to be 
released.69 Because the conviction could have lasting effects on the 
petitioner, the petitioner had a “redressable [sic]” interest in 
vindicating his good name.70 
In a final footnote, Justice Stevens addressed the contention 
between the majority and the concurrence, stating, “[g]iven the 
Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the 
habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that 
he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”71 
D. The Split 
Following the Spencer decision, a circuit split formed. Some 
jurisdictions, upon counting the votes of the concurrence and the 
dissent, determined that the favorable termination rule did not 
apply to released prisoners.72 The Tenth Circuit, for instance, held 
that the favorable termination rule should not apply to released 
prisoners because, according to the court: 
We are also persuaded that the Spencer plurality approach 
is both more just and more in accordance with the 
purpose of § 1983 than the approach of those circuits that 
strictly apply Heck even to petitioners who have been 
released from custody. If a petitioner is unable to obtain 
 
confinement to ‘a requirement analogous to the malicious-prosecution tort’s 
favorable-termination requirement,’ lest the plain breadth of § 1983 be 
unjustifiably limited at the expense of persons not ‘in custody’ within the meaning 
of the habeas statute.”). 
 68.  See id. at 22–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 69.  Id. at 22. 
 70.  Id. at 23. 
 71.  Id. at 25 n.8 (emphasis omitted). 
 72.  Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008, 1010–12 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Cohen 
v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1315–17 (10th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Johnson, 535 
F.3d 262, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2008); Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 
F.3d 592, 599–605 (6th Cir. 2007); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875–78 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 73–75 (2d Cir. 2001); Carr v. O’Leary, 
167 F.3d 1124, 1125–28 (7th Cir. 1999)). In total, seven circuits have adopted the 
reasoning of the Spencer concurrence in holding that the Heck favorable 
termination rule does not apply to released prisoners. Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316 
(“We are instead persuaded by the reasoning of the Second, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that we are free to follow the five-Justice 
plurality’s approach in Spencer on this unsettled question of law.”). 
14
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habeas relief—at least where this inability is not due to the 
petitioner’s own lack of diligence—it would be unjust to 
place his claim for relief beyond the scope of § 1983 
where “exactly the same claim could be redressed if 
brought by a former prisoner who had succeeded in 
cutting his custody short through habeas.”73 
Other courts decided to hold out for clear direction from the 
U.S. Supreme Court.74 
III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION 
The Eighth Circuit has decided to continue the application of 
the Heck rule to cases in which the prisoner has been released until 
there is more concrete direction from the Court. 
In Entzi v. Redmann, Entzi was convicted in North Dakota of 
gross sexual imposition.75 While in prison, he was required to 
undergo sex offender treatment.76 As part of the treatment, the 
participants were required to “work to lose their denial,” which 
would necessitate admitting their crimes.77 Entzi refused, protesting 
that as he had testified to his innocence at trial, a later admission 
would subject him to perjury charges.78 Entzi’s refusal led to prison 
officials revoking “performance-based sentence reductions,” an act 
that Entzi claimed lengthened his sentence by one year.79 In spite 
of attempts to the contrary, Entzi was released from prison and 
filed suit against his probation officer and prison officials.80 
 
 73.  Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1316–17 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., 
concurring)). 
 74.  Newmy, 758 F.3d at 1010; see also Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 
(8th Cir. 2007); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208–12 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that, 
after refusing to adopt the Spencer concurrence, successful completion of a 
diversionary program was not a favorable termination); Randell v. Johnson, 227 
F.3d 300, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (refusing to adopt the Spencer 
concurrence); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80–82 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal 
courts [must] follow [the Court’s] directly applicable precedent, even if that 
precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and 
to leave to the Court ‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (citing 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)). 
 75.  Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1000. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 1000–01.  
 80.  Id. at 1001 (“Several days before Entzi’s scheduled release from prison, 
his probation officer, Patrick Bohn, filed a petition to revoke probation based on 
15
Eubank: A Prisoner's Dilemma: The Eighth Circuit's Application of Heck v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
5. Eubank (603-636) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:56 PM 
618 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:603 
The court held that Entzi’s claims were barred by the Heck rule 
in spite of the fact that he had already been released from prison.81 
The court stated that it was bound to apply the Heck rule until the 
U.S. Supreme Court had made a definitive determination to the 
contrary.82 
IV. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS LAW 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides for habeas relief for state prisoners 
where custody contravenes the Constitution or a United States 
treaty.83 Traditionally, the only remedy for a successful habeas 
petition was equitable relief.84 This often meant the restoration of 
good time credits or release from custody.85 More and more, 
however, the habeas petition has been used to fight conditions in 
prisons.86 
 
Entzi’s failure to complete this sex offender treatment. On September 3, 2004, the 
state trial court dismissed Bohn’s petition, because it thought the requirement 
that Entzi admit his guilt during treatment ‘violates the 5th Amendment right to 
be free from self-incrimination’ and also ‘violates common sense.’”).  
 81.  Id. at 1003. For a more recent and thorough application of the Heck rule 
by the Eighth Circuit, see generally Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 
2014). In Newmy, Newmy sued his parole officer for falsely reporting that Newmy 
did not report as required. Id. at 1009. The alleged false report caused Newmy’s 
parole to be revoked. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court’s determination that the claim was not cognizable because Newmy had not 
obtained a favorable termination. Id. at 1011–12. The court noted, “[w]e 
recognize that this rule could preclude a damages remedy for an inmate who is 
detained for only a short time with limited access to legal resources, but that is a 
consequence of the principle barring collateral attacks that was applied in Heck.” 
Id. at 1012. 
 82.  Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1003. 
 83.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
 84.  See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(“[H]abeas corpus has been utilized as a procedural method of airing prisoner’s 
complaint and granting equitable relief where relief was indicated.”). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. These petitions concern a wide variety of issues. See Rozelle v. Rossi, 
307 F.App’x 640, 642 (3d Cir. 2008) (prescription acne medication); Bembry v. St. 
Lawrence, No. CV407-046, 2007 WL 4256984, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2007) (“His 
complaint seeks redress for overcrowding, double-celling, long hours of lockdown, 
cold food, small food portions, dirty food utensils, poor sanitation and air 
circulation, dirty showers, deprivation of property, deprivation of medical care, 
increased stress, exposure to homosexual activities, lack of jobs, deprivation of 
intelligent conversation, limited access to the law library, lost mail, deprivation of 
family contact, deprivation of home furnishings, and the high cost of phone 
16
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The writ cannot be granted unless state court remedies have 
been exhausted.87 The requirement that state court remedies be 
exhausted is generally known as the exhaustion doctrine.88 This 
doctrine was created because: 
Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings 
would tend to remove federal questions from the state 
courts, isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and 
thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality to 
federally protected interests. Second, (the doctrine) 
preserves orderly administration of state judicial business, 
preventing the interruption of state adjudication by 
federal habeas proceedings.89 
However, the principal “cannot be used as a blunderbuss to 
shatter the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without 
regard to the purposes that underlie the doctrine and that called it 
into existence.”90 
The exhaustion doctrine only applies to claims that are still 
remediable in state court proceedings.91 Further, the exhaustion 
doctrine, being a rule of comity, is not inflexible.92 The exhaustion 
doctrine does not apply at all if there is a complete absence of state 
 
service.”); Richards v. Richie, No. CIV. 13–3029, 2015 WL 1522237, at *2–3 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 30, 2015) (gluten-free dental floss). 
 87.  See supra text accompanying note 41.  
 88.  See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).  
 89.  Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) 
(quoting Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1038, 1094 (1970)). Or, put more daintily, “it would be unseemly in our dual 
system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction 
without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.” 
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). 
 90.  Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 
1965) (footnote omitted) (“The doctrine requiring a state prisoner to exhaust all 
state remedies as a prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief is a judge-made 
doctrine founded on comity and a proper regard for the position of the states in 
American federalism. Section 2254 of Title 28 is a congressional limitation on 
federal habeas corpus. It is not an absolute limitation.”). 
 91.  Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972) (holding that the petitioner 
had met the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine where direct appeal was no 
longer available).  
 92.  Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975) (determining that 
the exhaustion doctrine was satisfied where the arguments were presented to the 
highest court in the state, and that court declined to rule on the issue).  
17
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remedies or if protections of prisoners’ rights are otherwise 
ineffective.93 
Where a prisoner has failed to present his or her constitutional 
claim to a state court, a federal court, upon receiving the habeas 
petition, must conduct a four-step analysis to determine whether it 
can hear the case.94 The preliminary question is whether the 
prisoner presented the constitutional claims contained within the 
habeas petition to the state court.95 If the claims were not 
presented, the court would next look at whether the exhaustion 
doctrine has been met because there are no state remedies 
available or the available state remedies are futile.96 If the prisoner 
has not presented his or her claims and state remedies exist, the 
court must look at whether the prisoner has an excuse for not 
presenting the claims in state court.97 If the prisoner can establish a 
 
 93.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (stating that a habeas petition 
cannot be granted unless “there is an absence of available State corrective process; 
or . . . circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights 
of the applicant.”); Pate, 343 F.2d at 547.  
 94.  Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. The Court has not entertained whether the foreclosure of habeas to a 
released prisoner constitutes a lack of available remedy, but the fact that the Court 
chose not to discuss the lack of state remedy in Heck may be telling. See supra note 
61. On the other hand, earlier habeas cases may shed some light on what the 
Court might do. See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1949) (“Unless habeas 
corpus is available, therefore, we are led to believe that Illinois offers no post-trial 
remedy in cases of this kind. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, to 
which this Court has required the scrupulous adherence of all federal courts, see 
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 and cases cited, 
presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists.”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
433–35 (1963) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not cut off habeas relief unless 
prisoner intended to thwart the state court’s jurisdiction), overruled by Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Cady, 405 U.S. at 516 (“This Court has repeatedly 
made it plain that not every state procedural default bars federal habeas corpus 
relief. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c), which require a state prisoner to exhaust 
available state remedies, are limited in their application to those state remedies 
still open to the habeas applicant at the time he files his application in federal 
court.”). 
 97.  Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296. To satisfy this “cause” requirement, the plaintiff 
must show that there was “some objective factor external to the defense . . . .” 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479 (1986). Courts have found cause in the 
context of ineffective assistance of counsel, provided the prisoner can meet the 
burdens contained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Murray, 477 
U.S. at 488. The Strickland standard requires that the defendant show that 
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that 
18
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valid excuse, the prisoner must also show that he or she will be 
prejudiced if the case is dismissed on procedural grounds.98 
The cause and prejudice requirements may not be necessary in 
exceptional instances where a default would lead to a miscarriage 
of justice and the defendant is actually innocent.99 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Section 1983 Does Not Support the Application of the Favorable 
Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners 
1. Section 1983 Was Not Based on Principals of Comity but Was 
Specifically Meant to Interfere in State Affairs 
The above history of § 1983 lends support to not applying Heck 
to out-of-custody prisoners.100 While the majority in Heck correctly 
noted that the habeas corpus statute was meant to support comity, 
§ 1983 clearly was not.101 To the contrary, § 1983 was passed 
 
the defendant was in fact prejudiced by the deficiency. 466 U.S. at 687. The Court 
has also found cause where the constitutional issue is novel. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 
1, 15 (1984) (“Counsel’s failure to raise a claim for which there was no reasonable 
basis in existing law does not seriously implicate any of the concerns that might 
otherwise require deference to a State’s procedural bar. Just as it is reasonable to 
assume that a competent lawyer will fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a 
claim, it is also reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appreciate 
the claim. It is in the nature of our legal system that legal concepts, including 
constitutional concepts, develop slowly, finding partial acceptance in some courts 
while meeting rejection in others.”). More often, however, courts have rejected 
prisoners’ arguments. See Henderson v. Cohn, 919 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(illiteracy); Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 687–88 (10th Cir. 1991) (pro se, 
lacked legal training, unaware of issue); Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 
(8th Cir. 1988) (lack of English skills); Cornman v. Armontrout, 959 F.2d 727, 
729–30 (8th Cir. 1992) (unaware of claims, below-average intelligence); Harris v. 
Knipp, No. C 12–05114 YGR (PR), 2013 WL 6234651, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 
2013) (unaware of prosecutor’s unconstitutional actions). 
 98.  Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296. 
 99.  Murray, 477 U.S. at 495–96 (citation omitted) (“We remain confident 
that, for the most part, ‘victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet 
the cause-and-prejudice standard.’ But we do not pretend that this will always be 
true. Accordingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a 
federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause 
for the procedural default.”). 
 100.  See supra Part II. 
 101.  Compare supra text accompanying notes 28–30 (describing the purposes 
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specifically to interfere in state affairs.102 As the § 1983 framers 
understood it, the Act was specifically designed to thwart laws 
passed by states that would infringe on the constitutional rights of 
state citizens.103 These concerns arose from the Black Codes, which 
were passed shortly after the emancipation of the slaves in an effort 
to keep freed slaves in their place, both literally and figuratively.104 
Further, the Act was meant to spur the enforcement of laws 
equally by allowing recovery of damages to the victims of abuse at 
the hands of officials.105 This would certainly meddle in the affairs 
of states. 
Arguably, the second purpose of the Act, i.e., to supplement 
state law, would not directly interfere with states’ laws. However, 
monetary damages for lack of a sufficient remedy would interfere 
just as easily as monetary damages for inequitable application of a 
law. Additionally, the creation of a federal forum for wronged 
parties would certainly interfere in intrastate affairs.106 This was 
particularly true in the case of Blyew, in which a young woman 
witnessed the murder of several family members, but was unable to 
 
of § 1983 as intending to impede state attempts to deprive black persons of civil 
rights) with supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (describing the tension between 
state and federal courts giving rise to the exhaustion doctrine). 
 102.  See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also supra text accompanying notes 28–32 
(describing the purpose of the statute as meant to override certain state actions 
and place checks on state actors). 
 103.  See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. 
 104.  See id. 
 105.  See id. at 173–74. 
 106.  The impact of the federal forum for § 1983 claims is undeniable. 
Researchers have asserted that § 1983 actions make up approximately ten percent 
of federal district courts’ civil caseload. Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley, 
Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails: A Report on Section 1983 Litigation, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. i, iii (Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1994) [hereinafter Conditions of 
Prisons and Jails], http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/CCOPAJ.PDF. The 
volume of § 1983 cases have increased over time. In 1966 there were just 218 § 
1983 cases. Id. at 2. The 1961 Monroe case was largely responsible for opening the 
doors of the federal courts to § 1983 actions even though § 1983 had been in 
existence since the late 1800s. Karen M. Blum & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983 
Litigation, FED. JUD. CTR. 1, 2 . (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 1998), http://www.fjc.gov 
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Sect1983.pdf/$file/Sect1983.pdf. The Monroe decision, 
coupled with the decision in Cooper v. Pate, 278 U.S. 546 (1964), which held that 
prisoners have constitutional rights, caused the number of § 1983 cases to 
skyrocket. See Conditions of Prisons and Jails, supra, at 1–2. This led to a total of 
26,824 § 1983 cases in 1992. Id. at 2. 
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testify against the white defendants under Kentucky law.107 The 
chance of having to answer for crimes and other misdeeds in 
federal courts was—and continues to be—compelling.108 
The Court has noted the importance of applying the specific 
statute of habeas corpus over the general statute of § 1983.109 
However, § 1983 was much more specific in its aims: to override 
states in matters of constitutional violations.110 Due to the specific 
design of § 1983, it should not cede to the general principal of 
comity found within the habeas corpus statute.111 The Heck rule 
should not be applied to out-of-custody cases, particularly in light 
of the fact that the framers of the Act did not intend to defer to the 
states as the Court has.112 
2. Where a Prisoner Has Been Kept in Violation of Constitutional 
Rights, State Law Requires Supplementation 
The second lesson we can gather from history is that applying 
Heck to cases in which the prisoner is out of custody runs afoul of 
the second purpose of § 1983—supplementing state law.113 Senator 
Sherman used the example of a black person who had a case 
against a white person, but was unable to testify at trial due to local 
rules.114 In that example, the federal court would be able to provide 
a venue where a black person could testify against a white person.115 
The case of a released prisoner is similar. In the case of a 
prisoner released from state custody, the habeas claims would likely 
be mooted.116 In these situations, § 1983 should act as it was 
 
 107.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Blyew 
case). 
 108.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the Hibma case in 
which a man was framed by local law enforcement officers for burglaries that they 
themselves had committed).  
 109.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 110.  See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–74 (discussing the three purposes of the 
statute). 
 111.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 112.  See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–74. 
 113.  See id. at 173; supra text accompanying note 29 (citing state laws that 
would not allow a black person to testify against a white person as one reason for 
the statute). 
 114.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 115.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 116.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text (providing cases for every state 
in the Eighth Circuit in which a habeas corpus petition was dismissed for mootness 
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intended—to supplement state law where state law does not supply 
redress for harms committed under color of state authority.117 If a 
prisoner is wrongfully imprisoned, they should be released and 
compensated for the violation of their constitutional rights. 
One could argue that the danger of a § 1983 petition being 
mooted is fairly slim. Habeas corpus cases can take years to make it 
through the court system. The median processing time for a habeas 
petition is about six months.118 Ten percent of cases take upwards 
of seven hundred days.119 Most habeas petitions come from violent 
offenders.120 However, 39 percent of habeas petitions come from 
other offenders.121 The Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that 
the average sentence actually served by violent offenders was forty-
five months.122 We might be tempted to conclude that the 
possibility of a habeas petition being mooted is low, given that most 
prisoners who petition are serving roughly four years in prison.123 
However, the fact that only persons with long sentences are 
petitioning may be a symptom of the problem. Prisoners with valid 
complaints are not petitioning because the petition will be moot by 
the time it goes through the process.124 Under Heck, the favorable 
termination rule would work to have the same depressing effect on 
§ 1983 claims.125 
3. The U.S. Supreme Court Is Likely to Settle the Case in Favor of 
Allowing the Claims 
The next time the Court is required to address the issue, it is 
likely to find that the favorable termination rule does not apply to 
 
after the petitioner was released from confinement). 
 117.  See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. 
 118.  Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Habeas 
Corpus Review: Challenging State Court Criminal Convictions, DEP’T. OF JUST. 1, 17, 19 
(Tom Hester ed., 1995), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/FHCRCSCC.PDF. 
 119.  Id. at 19. 
 120.  Id. at 11. 
 121.  Id. Twenty-seven percent are from burglary, theft, drug trafficking, or 
weapons charges. Id. Another 12 percent come from other offenders. Id. 
 122.  Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Truth in 
Sentencing in State Prisons, DEP’T. OF JUST. 1 (Tom Hester & Tina Dorsey eds., 1999), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. 
 123.  See id.  
 124.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the probability that 
prisoners with shorter sentences will be precluded from filing § 1983 claims).  
 125.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 
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released prisoners. Both Justices Thomas and Kennedy were in the 
Heck and Spencer majorities, although Thomas also filed a separate 
concurrence.126 Both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were in the 
Spencer concurrence.127 The views of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Alito remain hidden. Following the 
death of Justice Scalia, there will likely be a new liberal justice 
appointed to the Court.128 If all of the liberal justices, including 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, follow the previous positions of 
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, there will be a five-vote majority 
against the application of the Heck rule to released prisoners.129 
Application of the favorable termination rule to released prisoners 
has a slight advantage according to current voting records.130 
However, the application of the courts of appeals may push 
the needle in the other direction. Currently, the Second, Fourth, 
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 1983 is 
not foreclosed to released prisoners.131 On the other side, only four 
circuits have applied the favorable termination rule to released 
prisoners.132 The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have refused to 
apply the favorable termination rule because justice so requires 
should be compelling where other courts have continued to apply 
the standard simply because they have decided to wait and see.133 
Finally, a majority of the Court has already implied that the 
favorable termination rule did not apply to released prisoners in 
Spencer, where Justice Stevens joined the four concurring justices in 
holding that § 1983 was not foreclosed to the released prisoner.134 
 
 126.  Id. at 478, 490–91; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 1 (1998).  
 127.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1. 
 128.  Josh Gerstein, Obama’s Supreme Court Short List, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2016, 
6:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/antonin-scalia-replacement-
219271. 
 129.  See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.  
 130.  See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.  
 131.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the 
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits accepted or 
applied the Spencer concurrence approach). 
 132.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the First, 
Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits chose to apply the favorable termination rule in 
spite of the Spencer concurrence). 
 133.  Compare Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(describing the Spencer approach as just), with Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80–
82 (1st Cir. 1998) (choosing to apply what the court viewed as direct precedent 
regardless of the weakened holding). 
 134.  See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18–25 (reaching a five-justice majority between the 
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Stare decisis should guide the current justices in deciding that the 
rule does not apply to out-of-custody prisoners. 
B. The Federal Habeas Corpus Statute Does Not Support the Application 
of the Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners 
1. Policy Considerations of the Federal Habeas Corpus Statute Do 
Not Support Application of the Favorable Termination Rule to 
Claims by Released Prisoners 
The Heck Court relied on the exhaustion doctrine as a basis of 
the favorable termination rule.135 However, a review of the 
exhaustion doctrine shows that it is more nuanced and forgiving 
than the Court acknowledged. 
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is comity,136 and due 
to its basis in comity, the doctrine cannot be used like a club.137 
However, because the aims of the doctrine are necessarily 
tempered by the needs of prisoners, courts and the legislature have 
adopted equitable safeguards.138 For instance, the four-step analysis 
adopted by courts ensures that prisoners will be heard when they 
have a legitimate claim.139 The last two steps in the analysis, known 
as the cause and prejudice standard, allow a prisoner to make his 
or her case that the default was excused.140 The Court has even 
offered an additional protection where the cause and prejudice 
standard cannot be met, which requires a showing of actual 
innocence and a potential miscarriage of justice.141 
Thus, where the Heck Court slammed the door on Heck, 
analysis under the exhaustion doctrine would have required the 
Court to dig deeper into the circumstances of Heck’s default: Is 
there an excusable reason for not presenting the claims in state 
court? Will the prisoner be prejudiced by the default? Will the 
 
four-justice concurrence and Justice Stevens’ dissent). 
 135.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. 
 136.  See supra text accompanying notes 83–89 (discussing the tension between 
state and federal habeas actions and the statute’s attempts to compromise the two 
interests). 
 137.  See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973); 
Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1965) (discussing the importance of 
using the exhaustion doctrine judiciously as it is based on comity).  
 138.  See Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; Pate, 343 F.2d at 547. 
 139.  See Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 140.  See id. 
 141.  See id. 
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss2/5
5. Eubank (603-636) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:56 PM 
2016] A PRISONER’S DILEMMA 627 
default result in a miscarriage of justice? Is the prisoner actually 
innocent? 
The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is not served by 
throwing up a complete bar. The exhaustion doctrine is meant to 
keep prisoners from prematurely removing constitutional issues 
from state to federal courts and to maintain comity between federal 
and state court systems.142 However, state courts are not 
disrespected where federal courts hear a prisoner petition that is 
completely mooted in the state court.143 Nor is there a risk of 
prematurely removing constitutional claims from state to federal 
courts due to the fact that the prisoner does not have a cause of 
action in state court. 
There is a concern that this analysis would open the hoary 
floodgates to the federal courts. One would expect that due to the 
large amount of procedural protections for the prisoner, very few 
claims would be rejected based on failure to exhaust state claims. 
However, in 1995, sixty-three percent of all habeas claims were 
dismissed on procedural grounds without ever reaching the 
merits.144 Of the sixty-three percent dismissed on procedural 
grounds, over half of those were rejected based on the failure to 
exhaust state remedies.145 This shows that allowing these safeguards 
will not require federal courts to slog through the merits of each 
and every petition, just the deserving cases.146 
The Court was correct when it stated that § 1983 did not afford 
a remedy in all circumstances, but a complete analysis would show 
that a remedy is not necessarily barred in these circumstances 
either. 
 
 142.  Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 143.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
 144.  Hanson & Daley, supra note 118, at 17. Only thirty-five percent of the 
claims go on to be denied on the merits. Id.  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Just one percent of petitions were granted on the merits. Id. Another one 
percent of cases were remanded to state courts. Id. 
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2. The Plain Language of the Statute Does Not Support the 
Application of the Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by 
Released Prisoners 
The first two steps from the four-step analysis come to us from 
the statute itself.147 They require an examination of whether there is 
a state remedy and whether that state remedy is adequate.148 If 
there is no state remedy or if it is inadequate, federal courts are 
instructed to hear the case.149 These prongs of the analysis are 
written in the disjunctive, thus allowing a claim to be heard even if 
state claims are not exhausted.150 Of course, this makes sense, as it 
would be difficult for a prisoner to exhaust remedies that never 
existed. 
For the released prisoner, this is particularly important. The 
claims of the released prisoner would be moot under state and 
federal habeas corpus case law.151 The favorable termination rule 
simply allows courts to ignore habeas corpus analysis, which 
requires a federal court to examine the adequacy and existence of 
state remedies. 
3. Habeas Corpus Case Law Does Not Support the Application of the 
Favorable Termination Rule to Claims by Released Prisoners 
Case law prior to Heck generally held that the exhaustion 
doctrine only applied to the claims that were alive for the purposes 
of state relief.152 
If the claim was not extinguished on state procedural grounds, 
it was ripe for relief under a federal habeas petition.153 The Court at 
one time went so far as to declare that the habeas statute only 
 
 147.  Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 148.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 149.  Smittie, 843 F.2d at 296.  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). The Court determined that a 
habeas petition was moot once the prisoner was no longer incarcerated. Id. at 18. 
Most state courts within the Eighth Circuit have reached the same conclusion 
when examining state habeas petitions.  
 152.  See, e.g., Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975).  
 153.  Id. (citing Smith v. Wolff, 506 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1974)) (“[T]he 
exhaustion standard is not an inflexible requirement: it is a rule of comity and not 
a rule limiting the power of the federal courts to give habeas relief.”). 
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barred claims where there was an attempt by the petitioner to 
circumvent state jurisdiction.154 
C. The Favorable Termination Approach 
Courts could, instead of relying on the lessons of § 1983 and § 
2254, take another approach. A recent United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota decision has already interpreted the 
requirement of favorable termination broadly to allow for the 
possible recovery of a released prisoner.155 The Steadman case is 
strikingly similar to the facts as described in Newcomb. Steadman’s 
judicially imposed sentence was meant to expire on December 9, 
2012.156 However, the Minnesota Department of Corrections added 
a five-year term of probation administratively, in spite of the 
Newcomb court’s clear directive that the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections did not have the power to unilaterally take such 
action.157 Steadman failed to meet the terms of his administratively-
added probation, and he was arrested on August 21, 2013.158 At 
some time before December 3, 2013, a Minnesota Department of 
Corrections employee began inquiring into Steadman’s status.159 
The Minnesota Department of Corrections then released Steadman 
on January 16, 2014.160 Upon release, Steadman received a letter 
from Eddie Miles, Jr., the warden of Minnesota Correctional 
Facility-Lino Lakes, which stated: 
On November 5, 2007, Ramsey County District Court 
sentenced you to the commissioner of corrections. Under 
the interpretation of the law at that time, the Department 
added a 5–year term of Conditional Release pursuant to 
Minn. Stat. § 169A.276 subd. 1(d). The term of 
Conditional release [sic] has been removed from your 
 
 154.  See id. at 1290 (quoting Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)) (“[I]t 
would be unseemly in our dual system of government for the federal district court 
to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to 
correct a constitutional violation.”). 
 155.  Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL 1954402, at *15 (D. Minn. Mar. 
23, 2015). See Wilson v. Lawrence Cty., Mo., 154 F.3d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“Wilson’s pardon is therefore an ‘executive order’ that ‘expunged,’ ‘obliterated,’ 
and ‘invalidated’ his conviction. Heck requires nothing more.”). 
 156.  Steadman, 2015 WL 1954402, at *2.  
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id.  
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sentence and you are hereby discharged as of December 
22, 2012 . . . .161 
In applying Heck, the court focused on the language of Heck 
regarding what constitutes a favorable termination: 
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other 
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render 
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must 
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.162 
The court reasoned that Heck expressly allowed for a favorable 
termination through “expunge[ment] by executive order.”163 The 
court also observed that the Eighth Circuit had previously held that 
an executive pardon was a means to favorable termination under 
the expungement-by-executive-order umbrella.164 The Steadman 
court went on to hold that the favorable termination requirement 
was met in Steadman’s case because “an agency within the 
executive branch of the State of Minnesota—the DOC—via the 
letter from Eddie Miles Jr., not only discharged Steadman from 
custody, but it also retroactively removed the entire term of 
conditional release that it had imposed on Steadman.”165 
The first observation is that the court’s reading of the 
executive expungement option is incredibly broad and likely a 
product of the procedural posture of the case. The opinion was 
issued following a motion to dismiss.166 The court managed to avoid 
ruling on whether there was an expungement by arguing that the 
facts before the court had not yet been developed adequately to 
rule on the issue.167 
Expungement generally has one of two meanings.168 The first is 
to erase a criminal conviction from a record.169 A second definition 
 
 161.  Id. at *3. 
 162.  Id. at *11 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). 
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at *14 (citing Wilson v. Lawrence Cty., Mo., 154 F.3d 757, 761 (8th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. at *1. 
 167.  Id. at *14. 
 168.  Wilson, 154 F.3d at 760. The court at the time was working with a 1990 
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is “[t]o erase or destroy . . . [t]o declare (a vote or other action) 
null and outside the record, so that it is noted in the original 
record as expunged, and redacted from all future copies.”170 The 
actual practices of the states lend themselves to the second 
definition. 
In actual practice, each state within the Eighth Circuit has a 
special provision for expungement.171 In all of these provisions, the 
courts carry out the act of expungement.172 Parties are required to 
petition the courts for relief from conviction.173 In these states, the 
executive branch has no role in criminal expungement.174 Thus, the 
literal interpretation of the language of Heck would leave it 
completely inapplicable as there are no executive branch 
expungements in the Eighth Circuit. Many of these statutory 
procedures addressing expungement, however, require favorable 
termination of the underlying criminal charges.175 
Nonetheless, overextending the definition may be 
problematic. For instance, finding that the letter is an executive 
expungement does not further the purpose for which the favorable 
termination rule was created. The rule was created so that a later 
 
version of Black’s Law Dictionary. See id. The definition has since been amended.  
 169.  Expungement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009). 
 170.  Id. The Wilson court noted that it preferred the definition “[t]o destroy; 
blot out; obliterate; erase; efface designedly; strike out wholly.” 154 F.3d at 760 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (6th ed. 1990)). According to the Wilson 
court, this is the more common definition. Id. 
 171.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 
2015 1st Ex. Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen. Assemb.); MINN. STAT. § 609A.03 (2015); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.140 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. 
Assemb.) (effective on Aug. 28, 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523 (West, 
Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 104th Leg.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 19-
03.1-23, 31-13-07 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 64th Leg. Assemb.); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 172.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413; MINN. STAT. § 609A.03; MO. ANN. STAT. § 
610.140; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 19-03.1-23, 31-
13-07; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8). 
 173.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (2015) (describing the circumstances 
under which a person may petition a court for an expungement). 
 174.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413; MINN. STAT. § 609A.02; MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 610.140; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-23; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.46(6), 123.47(8). 
 175.  See MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (allowing for expungement of certain records 
where there was either a favorable termination or the sentence was stayed); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523. 
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verdict in a civil litigation could not call into question the original 
criminal convictions.176 Allowing such a letter to satisfy the favorable 
termination rule would allow a collateral attack on the underlying 
conviction because the letter had no effect on it. The letter only 
stated that Steadman was being discharged (presumably from 
probation) and that the five-year term was being removed.177 If a 
similar letter—one stating that the term of probation had been 
removed and upon release there would be no probationary 
period—was given to an inmate who was still serving the original 
sentence, this reading of the favorable termination rule would 
allow the inmate to prosecute a § 1983 claim from his or her jail 
cell. 
While extending the reaches of executive expungement may 
be satisfying as a practical matter, there is a danger that 
overextension could lead to unintended results. 
D.  The Fact or Length of Confinement Approach 
Steadman likewise argued that his § 1983 petition was not 
challenging the fact or length of his confinement, but rather only 
challenged the constitutionality of the administrative term of his 
probation.178 
The U.S. Supreme Court once alluded to the fact that a 
former prisoner seeking money damages would not implicate the 
favorable termination rule.179 The Court rooted this dictum in the 
purposes of the habeas statute.180 The Court reasoned that the 
original purpose of the statute was for a prisoner to obtain release 
from unlawful imprisonment.181 
Unfortunately, courts have generally held that a § 1983 claim 
could have preclusive effects on habeas proceedings regardless of 
the relief sought.182 This would bring to life the fears of a myriad of 
§ 1983 actions causing havoc with convictions everywhere. 
 
 176.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). 
 177.  Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL 1954402, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 
23, 2015). 
 178.  Id. at *12. 
 179.  Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971).  
 182.  Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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E. A Better Rule 
The better rule, rather than following dicta in Heck, would be 
for the Eighth Circuit to recognize that the problem lies at the 
crossroads of two statutes, neither of which allow the door to be 
slammed in the face of a prisoner with a viable claim. Even though, 
as discussed above, § 1983 gives little deference to comity, comity 
can and should be served under the habeas corpus statute.183 
In the case of prisoners suing for monetary damages under § 
1983, this requires the Eighth Circuit to submit the claims to the 
complete analysis of the exhaustion doctrine. First, the court must 
look at whether the claims were in fact presented.184 Second, the 
court must determine whether there are no state remedies or if the 
state remedy is futile.185 Third, the prisoner must establish that 
there was cause that could excuse the prisoner’s failure to present 
the claims to the state court.186 Fourth, the prisoner must establish 
that the prisoner will be prejudiced if the claim cannot be heard.187 
Finally, the court must look at whether refusing to hear the case 
will result in a miscarriage of justice, and whether the prisoner was 
innocent-in-fact.188 
In the case of a prisoner released from custody, two issues 
arise. The first is whether a state remedy exists when the prisoner is 
out of custody. The Court has thus far not been required to 
examine whether state remedies are foreclosed once a prisoner is 
released because the Court has defaulted to the federal mootness 
analysis.189 The Eighth Circuit should conclude that release from 
prison does foreclose state remedies for the purpose of this 
analysis. First, both state and federal courts have generally held that 
 
 183.  See supra Section V.B.1 (discussing the importance of comity in the 
habeas corpus statute). 
 184.  See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972). 
 185.  Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289–90 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 186.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012); Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546, 
547 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 187.  Smittie v. Lockhart, 843 F.2d 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 188.  Id. at 297. 
 189.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see Anderson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 
403, 404 (Ark. 2003) ; Case v. Wood, 377 N.W.2d 924, 924 (Minn. 1985); State ex 
rel. D.W. v. Hensley, 574 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); State ex rel. 
Magrum v. Nygaard, 38 N.W.2d 370, 370 (N.D. 1949); Moeller v. Solem, 395 
N.W.2d 165, 165–66 (S.D. 1986). 
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release from prison moots habeas corpus claims.190 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the absence of a habeas remedy 
means that the state remedy is foreclosed.191 The Eighth Circuit 
need only apply the same principal and case law to § 1983 cases. 
A federal court may be required, however, to interpret state 
law regarding whether the petition is actually foreclosed. This is 
nothing new; the Court has required the same analysis in other 
cases by holding that the exhaustion doctrine only applies to issues 
that are alive.192 Determining which claims are alive or dead 
necessarily would require a court to delve into state law. 
The second issue is whether the fact that the prisoner has been 
released from prison is cause for not bringing the claims to a state 
tribunal. The Court has only allowed narrow factual circumstances 
to provide cause.193 A released prisoner could potentially rely on 
the novelty of the constitutional issue.194 In the case study discussed 
in the introduction, for instance, the prisoner, the Minnesota 
Commissioner of Corrections, and the courts did not know that the 
practices involved were unconstitutional until the case went up on 
appeal.195 A released prisoner may be able to succeed where they 
can show ineffective assistance of counsel.196 An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is further limited by the requirement 
that it meet the Strickland standard.197 The prisoner must show that 
 
 190.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7; see Anderson, 98 S.W.3d at 404; Case, 377 N.W.2d at 
924; D.W., 574 S.W.2d at 391; Magrum, 38 N.W.2d at 370; Moeller, 395 N.W.2d at 
165–66. 
 191.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 193.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that the cause 
requirement may be met by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but little 
else). 
 194.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing a number of different 
arguments that have been unsuccessful in the habeas context, including the 
novelty of the issue).  
 195.  State ex rel. Newcomb v. Roy, No. A10-2075, 2011 WL 2437489, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011); see Steadman v. Roy, No. 14-3442, 2015 WL 
1954402, at *12 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2015) (discussing the Minnesota 
Commissioner of Correction’s duty to change the policies of the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections after it was determined in Newcomb that the 
administrative addition of conditional release was unconstitutional). 
 196.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 197.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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counsel fell below an objective standard and that the prisoner was 
prejudiced by the faulty representation.198 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When a prisoner submits a claim under § 1983, the claim rests 
at the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas corpus statute.199 
However, neither of those statutes supports the application of 
Heck’s favorable termination rule to cases in which released 
prisoners bring a claim under § 1983.200 The favorable termination 
rule would bar the claim where state remedies were not first 
exhausted.201 In the case of released prisoners, this would mean a 
complete bar to the claim, as the claims of prisoners are moot for 
the purposes of habeas corpus following prisoners’ release from 
custody.202 
The better rule is to apply the four-step analysis courts apply to 
the exhaustion doctrine.203 This would allow a released prisoner to 
make his or her case that state remedies are no longer available 
due to mootness.204 It would further allow the prisoner to show 
cause and prejudice.205 This is a difficult standard to meet, which 
would likely mean that the proverbial floodgates would not be 
opened.206 In fact, there are a very few and narrow situations in 
which a released prisoner could succeed.207 One of these may be 
where the claim is so novel that the prisoner did not recognize it 
until after the prisoner was released.208 Another situation may be 
where ineffective assistance of counsel led to a failure to make a 
petition or submit a faulty petition.209 In relying on mere dicta in 
Heck and waiting for clearer guidance from the Court, the Eighth 
 
 198.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 199.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 479 (1994). 
 200.  See supra Sections V.A–B.  
 201.  See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 202.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 203.  See supra Section V.E.  
 204.  See supra Section V.E. 
 205.  See supra Section V.E.  
 206.  See supra Section V.E. 
 207.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 208.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit has taken the path of least resistance.210 The path of least 
resistance has made this particular river crooked. 
 
 
 210.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492–96 (1994). 
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